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Abstract
Quick decision making under risk is ubiquitous in modern times, yet its consequences
are not fully understood. Time pressure might change people's risk preferences, lead
to less consistent choices, or change people's decision strategy. With the present
work, we make the novel contribution of testing all hypotheses against each other in
a unifying hierarchical Bayesian model. In two studies, participants decided repeat-
edly between two risky gambles either with or without high time pressure. We found
a significant increase in risky choices under time pressure. With modeling, we show
that time pressure decreased choice consistency but did not systematically affect
people's risk preferences. In addition, the number of participants using simple, non-
compensatory strategies increased slightly under time pressure. Finally, participants
did not systematically choose easier gambles more often under time pressure. Thus,
a reliable analysis of the effect of time pressure on preferential choice requires a
model framework that allows for the distinction between the various effects time
pressure can have.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
In business and in private, decisions are often made quickly. This
happens when an investor needs to react quickly to incoming
information in trading, when investment offers are made with a
time limit, or when opportunity costs of evaluating an investment
choice must be considered. Risk is ubiquitous in investment
choices, and risk preferences are at the core of economic utility
models. To understand how time pressure affects choices under
risk is thus an important topic from both a practical and a theoreti-
cal standpoint.
Past research suggests that time pressure can make people more
or less risk averse (e.g., Madan et al., 2015; Zur & Breznitz, 1981).
Such an effect would have important consequences, as it implies that
investment choices are systematically distorted when under time
pressure and not in accordance with investors' risk preferences with-
out time pressure.
Yet there is an often overlooked but very plausible alternative
explanation of this effect, namely, that decisions could become
more inconsistent because they involve more noise. This means
choice consistency is reduced, but choices are on average still unbi-
ased with respect to the underlying risk preferences under no time
pressure. In addition, a change in observed choices could also be
the result of people selecting simpler and thus quicker decision
strategies under time pressure. Our goal in the present work was to
test these competing hypotheses rigorously against one another to
provide a better understanding of the effect of time pressure on
decision making under risk.
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1.1 | Preference shifts
Most previous studies suggested that people in the gain domain
become less risk averse under time pressure compared with under
low or no time pressure. This conclusion was based on choice propor-
tions directly (Madan et al., 2015; Saqib & Chan, 2015), on modeling
of certainty equivalents with cumulative prospect theory (Young
et al., 2012), or on modeling behavior in a card game with a mean–
variance model and cumulative prospect theory (Nursimulu &
Bossaerts, 2014). Yet some studies did not find evidence for a prefer-
ence shift in the gain domain: in one study, this inference was based
on a preference rating of risky scenarios (Maule et al., 2000). In
another, either individually time-constrained risky decisions or time-
constrained multiple price lists were examined (Kocher et al., 2013).
Finally, people were also found to become more risk averse when
under time pressure by, again, comparing risky choice proportions
under conditions of low and high time pressure (Zur &
Breznitz, 1981). An explanation of a direct shift in risk preferences
through time pressure could be an increased influence of intuition or
affect (e.g., Young et al., 2012).
As a limitation, inferences about the effect of time pressure can
be ambiguous when based on comparisons of choice proportions only.
For instance, suppose participants in an experiment choose the riskier
of two gambles with a similar expected value (EV) in around 40% of all
cases, which could be interpreted as risk aversion. If the proportion of
riskier choices increases to around 45% under high time pressure, this
could be interpreted as a decrease in risk aversion due to time pres-
sure. However, if participants make more unsystematic mistakes
under high time pressure and choices become less consistent, the
choice proportions would also change toward 50%. Thus, in this case,
both a preference shift and a decrease in consistency could explain
the observed choice data (see Olschewski et al., 2018).
1.2 | Decrease in choice consistency
A theoretical framework useful for understanding the effect of time
pressure is the speed–accuracy trade-off, where higher decision
speed is associated with more errors or less consistency (Heitz, 2014,
for a review). This trade-off is predicted by the drift diffusion model, a
prominent sequential sampling model of decision making (for a review,
see Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). Experimental evidence for this trade-
off in human decision making was found, for instance, in the dot-
motion task, where participants have to decide in which direction a
cloud of dots is predominantly moving. Applying time pressure in such
a task increases error rates (Forstmann et al., 2008).
This trade-off might have been given less attention in the prefer-
ential decision-making literature because in the domain of prefer-
ences, no (or only a few) outside criteria exist for classifying a single
decision as an error. One way to address this problem is to make peo-
ple rate options individually and define an error in a subsequent binary
choice task as the choice of a lower rated option. Under these condi-
tions, participants made more errors under time pressure than in a
control condition in food choices (Milosavljevic et al., 2010). However,
this method assumes that individual ratings translate to format-
independent utility orders.
Here, we propose another method to measure decision errors.
Assuming a person's risk preference can be represented by an
expected utility framework, options can be ordered according to their
utility. In this case, choice consistency is a measure of how many
empirically observed choices are in accordance with the underlying
utility order. The higher the consistency, the fewer deviations from a
given utility order have been made. The random utility model we
introduce below can estimate the best fitting utility order and the
associated choice consistency simultaneously for a given choice
pattern.
In risky choices, time pressure has rarely been associated with a
decrease in choice consistency. As an exception, Dror et al. (1999)
estimated a sequential sampling model and concluded that time pres-
sure decreased the decision threshold parameter of the sequential
sampling model, leading to a decrease in choice consistency. A limita-
tion of this study is that it did not test a change in risk preferences as
an alternative response to time pressure within the sequential sam-
pling model.
1.3 | Strategy shifts
When people make decisions, they can in principle incorporate all
information (i.e., all outcomes and probabilities of a gamble) and
integrate the information for an overall assessment. But under time
pressure, participants might realize that they cannot process all
information or have insufficient time to integrate all information
sensibly, so they may select a simpler strategy for making their
choices. A strategy shift is an alternative explanation for a change in
risk-taking behavior (e.g., Kocher et al., 2013) and the meta-decision
to change strategies is at the core of the adaptive-decision-maker
framework (Payne et al., 1993).
Decision strategies differ in various aspects, such as the number
of steps they require. One fundamental distinction is that between
compensatory and noncompensatory (NC) strategies: compensatory
strategies usually make use of all available information and allow for
compensation—that is, an option's disadvantages can be compensated
for by its advantages. In contrast, NC strategies often focus on a
single dimension of an option, and if an option is doing badly on this
dimension, it cannot be compensated for by other dimensions.
A prominent example of a compensatory strategy is the mean–
variance model (e.g., Spiliopoulos & Hertwig, 2019), which summarizes
all possible outcomes in the EV and captures the variability of these
outcomes as the standard deviation (SD). Prominent NC strategies are
the lexicographic rule (e.g., Fishburn, 1974) and the priority heuristic
(Brandstätter et al., 2006), which both compare options by focusing
on single pieces of information.
When making decisions under time pressure, people are more
likely to select simple NC strategies over compensatory ones
(e.g., Payne et al., 1988, 1996; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999, 2008;
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Svenson & Maule, 1993; Wright, 1974). However, most research
about strategy shifts has not explicitly examined whether time pres-
sure also leads to changes in people's risk preferences.
Another strategic reaction to an increase in time pressure could
be to stick to options that are easier to comprehend and stay away
from more complex options. There are formal ways to define com-
plexity of choice problems (Bossaerts & Murawski, 2017), but for risky
gambles, complexity is often operationalized as a gamble's number of
outcomes (e.g., Moffatt et al., 2015): the higher the number of out-
comes, the more numbers participants have to process. In addition,
the more numbers there are, the more difficult it is to determine a
gamble's characteristics, such as the EV or SD. Prior studies found
that people chose easier gambles more often than complex ones
regardless of time pressure (Huck & Weizsäcker, 1999; Mador
et al., 2000; Wilcox, 1993). However, a recent study showed that only
50% of the participants systematically chose easier options more
often (Moffatt et al., 2015). To our knowledge, the potential effect
that time pressure leads to a higher frequency of choosing simpler
gambles has not been tested yet.
1.4 | The current approach
In summary, there are three ways time pressure might change risk-
taking behavior: by causing (a) a direct change in risk preferences, (b) a
decrease in choice consistency within a compensatory strategy, or
(c) a switch from a compensatory to an NC strategy. Most previous
research has examined one of these hypotheses in isolation. As we
showed above, this can be problematic, because all three explanations
can lead to similar behavioral patterns. Mathematical models are nec-
essary to distinguish among them.
Consequently, we chose to examine all three hypotheses simulta-
neously using a unifying hierarchical Bayesian modeling framework.
We examined data collected in two experiments where participants
decided repeatedly between risky gambles either under high time
pressure or in a control condition with low time pressure using a
within-subject design.
2 | MATHEMATICAL MODELS
2.1 | Random utility framework
To model risk preferences, we implemented the mean–variance
approach as a compensatory model stating that both the EV and the
SD of a gamble contribute to its utility:
U að Þ= EV að Þ+ β SD að Þ, ð1Þ
where a is a gamble with two or four outcomes. For gambles with one
certain outcome, the SD is set to 0. The risk preference parameter β
specifies whether and to what extent people are risk averse (i.e., β < 0),
risk neutral (i.e., β = 0), or risk seeking (i.e., β > 0). Stochasticity in the
choice process is modeled with a probit link function:




with U(y) and U(x) as the utility of two gambles x and y defined as in
Equation 1. The probit link function ϕ() maps the utility difference into
choice probabilities between 0 and 1. The consistency parameter θ
determines how sensitively the model responds to utility differences,
with smaller θ implying more consistent behavior.
There are other error models used in the literature
(e.g., Stott, 2006) that we implemented for robustness analyses.
Among the most prominent alternative link functions is the logit
function:
p yð Þ= 1
1+ exp −φ U yð Þ−U xð Þð Þð Þ : ð3Þ
Here, larger φ implies more consistency, that is, less error. A sim-
pler link function between utility order and choices that does not take
the utility difference between gambles into account is the constant or
trembling-hand error model (Harless & Camerer, 1994):
p yð Þ= I U yð Þ>U xð Þ½   1−ρð Þ+ I U yð Þ<U xð Þ½  ρ+ I U yð Þ=U xð Þ½  0:5,
ð4Þ
with ρ a free parameter estimating the percentage of trials where an
inferior gamble according to the assumed utility model is chosen. The
higher ρ is, the larger the error and thus the lower the choice consis-
tency. I(a) is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if state-
ment a is true and the value of 0 if a is false.
We estimated all models with a hierarchical Bayesian approach.
This means we estimated posterior distributions of the β and θ param-
eters for each participant. The individual posteriors then fed into a
group posterior distribution. We experimentally manipulated time
pressure and gamble complexity in the two experiments using a
within-subject design. To incorporate the effects of both manipula-
tions, we decomposed β and θ according to our within-subject design.
For each trial i and each participant j, we got
βi,j = β0,j + δβ,j condi,j + βsafe,j easysafe,i,j + βrisky,j easyrisky,i,j, ð5Þ
θi,j = θ0,j + δθ,j condi,j + θsafe,j easysafe,i,j + θrisky,j easyrisky,i,j: ð6Þ
Here, β0,j and θ0,j are the individual means, and the δs estimate
half of the difference between conditions operationalized as a dummy
variable cond that is +1 in the control and −1 in the time pressure con-
dition. Similarly, to assess the effect of gamble complexity on both risk
preference and choice consistency, we used two effect-coded
dummies (easysafe and easyrisky) for trials where the safer or the riskier
gamble was easier, respectively, with the complex trials as the
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baseline. In the data model, θi,j is probit transformed to be between
0 and 1.
2.2 | Compensatory and NC strategies
To examine the hypothesis of a strategy shift under time pressure, we
used a Bayesian finite-mixture model (Bartlema et al., 2014; Gelman
et al., 2014) with two mixture variables: on the first layer, data were
described by either a compensatory or an NC strategy. On the second
layer, a mixture variable determined which of three NC strategies was
implemented. Both mixture variables were implemented on the group
level. This means we assume heterogeneity across participants with
respect to the used strategies, but a given participant uses the same
strategy in all trials in a given condition.
The compensatory strategy was represented by the stochastic
utility model outlined in Equations 1 and 2. It is compensatory
because a potential bad outcome of a gamble can be compensated for
by a potential good outcome. Compensatory strategies are usually
assumed to be attention and time consuming (e.g., Payne et al., 1993;
but see Glöckner & Betsch, 2012).
We incorporated three NC strategies, which each use single out-
come comparisons sequentially in different orders. In these strategies,
a good second outcome cannot make up for a bad outcome used for
comparison. The outcome comparison stops as soon as a comparison of
two outcomes results in a noticeable difference and the gamble with
the higher outcome is chosen. TheNC strategies have two free parame-
ters: one is the threshold μ that determines how large the difference
between two outcomes has to be to lead to a decision. Theoretically,
this threshold is motivated by research in psychophysics that shows
two stimuli need a minimum difference for participants to reliably
detect it (just noticeable difference: Thaler, 1980; Thurstone, 1927; see
also Fishburn, 1974). The second free parameter ϵ is a trembling-hand
error (see Equation 4) as the percentage of times the inferior gamble
(i.e., the gamble with the lower outcome) is chosen by mistake.
Although such a choice function usually does not fit data as well as the
above-applied probit function, it is more plausible for NC strategies
where we assume that comparisons are made on an ordinal scale. If no
outcome comparison leads to a decision, then one of the two gambles
is chosen randomly.
The choice probabilities are calculated as follows:
p yð Þ=
if x1 > y1 + μð Þ) ε
if y1 > x1 + μð Þ)1−ε
else :
if x2 > y2 + μð Þ) ε







where one outcome from gamble x will be compared with one out-
come from gamble y and the subscripts signify a certain order of
outcome comparisons: Order 1 sorts all outcomes according to their
probability of occurrence, starting with the outcome with the highest
probability. Order 2 sorts by outcomes and starts comparing the
highest outcomes of each gamble. Finally, Order 3 again sorts by out-
comes but starts comparing the lowest outcomes of each gamble.
Although these NC strategies do not take risk preferences explicitly
into account, the comparison order can produce risk-averse choices;
for example, when starting by comparing the lowest outcomes of each
gamble as in Order 3, the safer gamble usually has a higher minimum
outcome then the more risky gamble implying risk-averse choices (see
Pachur et al., 2017).
To examine whether time pressure increased the use of NC strat-
egies, we again used the dummy variable cond and modified the mix-
ture variable on the group level accordingly:
zcond = z0 + δz  cond: ð8Þ
Here, zcond is the probability of a Bernoulli distribution of
implementing either the compensatory or one of the NC strategies on
the group level. The higher zcond is, the more participants are described
by one of the NC strategies. In the data model, zcond is probit trans-
formed to be between 0 and 1. The mixture variables on the second
layer (g1, g2, and g3) determining which NC strategy was implemented
as well as the threshold and the trembling-hand error for the NC strat-
egies were fixed across both conditions on the group level.
We used uninformative group priors and estimated all parameters
with the MCMC sampler from JAGS in R (Plummer, 2003). Conver-
gence of estimation chains was checked with the Gelman and
Rubin (1992) statistic, which was below 1.03 for all reported group
posteriors.
3 | EXPERIMENT 1
3.1 | Method
3.1.1 | Experimental design
Participants made 240 choices between two gambles in two blocks. In
each block, there was a countdown at the upper right corner of the
screen that indicated the time until a decision was required. Partici-
pants saw the same 120 gambles in each block in randomized order.
Gambles were created by randomly drawing outcomes and proba-
bilities, controlling for informative choice situations in terms of EV and
SD differences. The complexity of the gambles was varied in three
within-subject conditions. In the complex condition, both gambles
consisted of two outcomes, where the outcomes and their respective
probabilities were never multiples of 10. In the safe-easy condition,
the safer gambles were always a sure outcome, and the riskier gam-
bles were constructed as in the complex condition. In the risky-easy
condition, the riskier gambles (i.e., those with the larger variance) both
had outcomes that were multiples of 10 and occurred with equal
probability of 50%, which made this option simpler to evaluate,
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whereas the safer option was constructed as in the complex condition.
That way, although the number of outcomes and probabilities were
the same for both gambles, the riskier gamble was easier to process.
3.1.2 | Time pressure manipulation
In the control condition, we introduced very low time pressure by giv-
ing participants 30 s to make a choice, whereas under high time pres-
sure, participants had only 2 s. We derived this manipulation through
pretesting. We first gave people two certain outcomes with pie charts
in the same format as in the main study and asked them to decide
which outcome was larger. The median reaction time for that task
was 1.80 s with high accuracy. This seemed to be a good estimate of
the information-processing time needed by participants.
3.1.3 | Participants and incentive
We aimed for 40 participants, because previous experience with the
hierarchical Bayesian model indicated that a comparable sample size
with risky choices led to robust estimation results. The study was
approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Department of
Psychology at the University of Basel. Participants were 43 current or
former students of the University of Basel (nine male, 34 female;
Mage = 23.53 years; range 19 to 43 years).
Participants were given the choice between receiving course
credit or a flat payment of CHF 20 per hour. In addition, one trial was
randomly drawn and the outcome paid out. Participants earned an
average bonus of CHF 6 (range: CHF 1 to 9.90). The experiment
lasted around 1 h.
3.1.4 | Procedure
The experiment was conducted at individual computers. Participants
read the instructions on paper and answered two questions to check
if they understood the task. Only when they answered both questions
correctly were they allowed to continue with the experiment. The
order of the control and time pressure blocks was alternated. One
block consisted of 120 trials with constructed gamble pairs presented
in random order.
Prior to each trial a fixation cross appeared in the middle of the
screen for 300 ms. Gambles were presented as pie charts (see
Figure 1). Participants could choose one of the two gambles by press-
ing “D” for the left or “L” for the right option. After a choice, the
respective gamble was marked with a blue rectangle for 300 ms, and
then, a new trial was presented. Once the decision time was up, par-
ticipants were not able to make a choice. Instead, a screen appeared
for 1 s stating that they were too slow. Participants did not earn any
bonus when a trial was chosen in which they did not make a choice
in time.
3.2 | Results
3.2.1 | Choice data
Participants chose the riskier (i.e., higher SD) gamble in 36% of the tri-
als in the control and in 40% in the time pressure condition, a signifi-
cant difference, W(n = 43) = 276.5, p = .029.1 Figure 2 plots the
percentage of risky choices against the EV difference of the two gam-
bles. Choices for riskier gambles increased with EV in both conditions
(bEV = 0.05, SE = 0.002, p < .001). The less steep slope in the figure
shows that the EV difference had a stronger impact on choice propor-
tions in the control than in the time pressure condition, indicating that
choice consistency was lower in the high time pressure condition.
The complexity of gambles had an influence on choice propor-
tions. The proportion of risky choices was lower in the safe-easy trials
(34%; bsafe = −0.24, SE = 0.06, p < .001) and higher in risky-easy trials
(43%; brisky = 0.30, SE = 0.06, p < .001), each compared with the com-
plex trials (37%). Figure 3 shows the choice proportions separately for
the control and time pressure conditions and the three different gam-
ble complexities.
3.2.2 | Reaction time data
Reaction times were significantly different in the control
(Mdn = 3.63 s, SD = 2.75) and time pressure (Mdn = 1.78 s, SD = 0.53)
conditions, W(n = 43) = 946, p < .001. Figure 4 shows the median
F IGURE 1 Schematic screenshots of the decision screen. Left: complex gambles; middle: safe-easy condition; right: risky-easy condition. ECU
refers to the artificial currency used throughout the experiment, and the red number at the top-right corner indicates the time left
1W stands for a Wilcoxon test, which was used for the percentage of risky choices to make
the test robust against a nonnormal distribution of the data.
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reaction times for the different conditions. Choices in the safe-easy
condition were faster than in the complex condition (bsafe = −0.17,
SE = 0.01, p < .001), but choices in the risky-easy condition were
made at the same pace as in the complex condition. This could indi-
cate that the risky-easy gambles were not perceived as easier than
the complex gambles.
3.2.3 | Modeling choice data
We used the mean–variance model outlined in Equations 1 and 2 to
estimate people's risk preferences and choice consistency
simultaneously. In the baseline model, ignoring complexity, the group-
level estimate for the risk preference parameter was β0 = −0.39, 95%
highest density interval (HDI) [−0.53, −0.25], meaning that people
were risk averse on average. The group-level choice consistency
parameter was θ0 = −0.76, 95% HDI [−0.80, −0.72]. The group-level
effect of time pressure on risk preference was δβ = 0.01, 95% HDI
[−0.06, 0.09]. The 95% posterior HDI included 0; thus, there was no
credible effect of time pressure on participants' risk preferences. In
contrast, the group-level effect of time pressure on choice consis-
tency was δθ = −0.29, 95% HDI [−0.36, −0.23]. The posterior 95%
HDI did not include 0; thus, time pressure credibly decreased partici-
pants' choice consistency. Retransformed to the scale of the data
F IGURE 3 Percentage of riskier choices in control and time
pressure conditions for each of the three levels of gamble complexity.
Error bars are 95% confidence intervals
F IGURE 4 Median reaction times (in seconds) in control and time
pressure conditions for each of the three levels of gamble complexity.
Error bars are 95% confidence intervals
F IGURE 2 Choice
percentages for the riskier gamble
by expected value
(EV) differences between riskier
and safer gambles on the group
(line and larger dots) and
individual (smaller dots) level.
Error bars are 95% confidence
intervals
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model, the consistency parameter was estimated to be 0.15 in the
control condition and 0.32 under time pressure. Figure 5 shows that
the individual effects of time pressure on risk preference were rather
unsystematic, whereas the individual estimates of choice consistency
decreased for almost all participants under time pressure.
Note that this result modified the model-free analysis of choice
data reported above: whereas the regression revealed an effect of time
pressure on choice proportions, the stochastic utility model
decomposed this effect into a possible shift in risk preferences or in
choice consistency. The model identified a decrease in choice consis-
tency rather than a shift in risk preferences as the more likely explana-
tion for the observed change in choice proportions under time pressure.
To test the robustness of this result, we implemented other sto-
chastic link functions as discussed above, namely, the logit function
(Equation 3) and the trembling-hand error (Equation 4). With a logit
link function, we again found that risk preferences did not change,
δβ = 0.03, 95% HDI [−0.05, 0.10], whereas the logit consistency
parameter did change under time pressure, δφ = 0.32, 95% HDI [0.25,
0.39]. This again implies less choice consistency under time pressure.
Similarly, for the trembling-hand error, risk preference did not change,
δβ = 0.02, 95% HDI [−0.06, 0.11], but the trembling-hand error credi-
bly differed between the two conditions with δρ = −0.31, 95% HDI
[−0.40, −0.21]. This means that under time pressure, participants
more often chose the option with the lower latent utility. In sum, a
credible decrease in choice consistency due to time pressure is robust
to the use of these alternative error models.
3.2.4 | Gamble complexity
To incorporate the effect of gamble complexity, we included two
dummies with the complex condition as a baseline as outlined in
Equations 5 and 6. We added these dummies as well as the interac-
tion of complexity with time pressure sequentially for both the risk
preference and the consistency parameters. The full model with com-
plexity as a main effect and the interaction effects for both risk pref-
erence and choice consistency parameters fitted the data best
according to WAIC (Vehtari et al., 2017). In all specifications, the main
effect of time pressure was credibly different from 0 for the choice
consistency parameter but not for the risk preference parameter.
Group posteriors were also comparable in magnitude to the more par-
simonious specification discussed above. Gamble complexity had a
credible effect on risk preference in that risk aversion was stronger in
the safe-easy condition (βsafe = −0.14, 95% HDI [−0.23, −0.05]) and
weaker in the risky-easy condition (βrisky = 0.16, 95% HDI [0.09,
0.23]), each compared with the complex condition. Furthermore, gam-
ble complexity credibly increased choice consistency in the safe-easy
condition (θsafe = −0.07, 95% HDI [−0.13, −0.004]) but not in the
risky-easy condition (θrisky = −0.05, 95% HDI [−0.11, 0.01]). All model
results, including estimates for interactions between complexity and
time pressure, can be found in Table S1.
3.2.5 | Strategy shift
To examine whether participants applied different strategies under
high and low time pressure, we added three NC strategies as
described in Equations 7 and 8 to the model. The group-level mixture
variable was z0 = −1.33, 95% HDI [−1.83, −0.88], meaning that across
both conditions, behavior of around 10% of the participants were best
explained by one of the three NC strategies and 90% of participants
were best explained by the compensatory mean–variance model. The
group-level effect of time pressure was δz = −0.58, 95% HDI [−1.13,
−0.08] and credibly different from 0. This means that the probability
of classifying a participant as using the NC strategy increased from
4% in control to 23% under time pressure. Based on the individual
level posteriors, only one participant in the control condition and eight
in the time pressure condition had a higher than 50% posterior proba-
bility of their choices being better explained by the NC strategies
rather than by the compensatory strategy.
Additionally, the group-level threshold for the three NC strategies
was μ = 0.15, 95% HDI [0.05, 0.27] for a standardized outcome range
between 0 and 1. The group-level trembling-hand error rate for the
NC strategies was ε = 0.16, 95% HDI [0.07, 0.26]. Finally, the three
F IGURE 5 Risk preference β
(left) and choice consistency θ
(right) group posterior parameter
estimates at the margins and
individual mean posterior
estimates in the main graphs.
Estimates were retrieved from
the full model with complexity
main and interaction effects
(Model 7 in Table S1)
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group-level mixture probabilities were g1 = 0.08, 95% HDI [0.0001,
0.24], for the probability order; g2 = 0.18, 95% HDI [0.004, 0.39], for
the decreasing outcome order; and g3 = 0.74, 95% HDI [0.48, 0.96],
for the increasing outcome order. This means that the outcome order
starting with comparing the lowest outcomes was best suited to
explain a participant's behavior if this participant was selected to use
an NC strategy.
Finally, even when allowing for the use of NC strategies, the con-
clusion from the first model held: group-level choice consistency of
the compensatory strategy was still credibly lower under time pres-
sure, δθ = −0.25, 95% HDI [−0.31, −0.19], whereas risk preference did
not differ between conditions, δβ = −0.03, 95% HDI [−0.10, 0.04].
4 | EXPERIMENT 2
To examine the robustness of the results of Experiment 1, we con-
ducted Experiment 2 in which we used a different complexity manipu-
lation and determined time pressure individually.
4.1 | Method
4.1.1 | Experimental design
Again, we examined the effect of time pressure on risk taking in a
within-subject design by asking participants to choose between two
risky gambles repeatedly. Complexity was manipulated by the number
of outcomes of a gamble. There were three conditions: complex (both
gambles consisted of four outcomes each); safe-easy (the safer gam-
ble with lower variance had only two outcomes); and risky-easy (the
riskier gamble with higher variance had only two outcomes).
4.1.2 | Gamble stimuli
We randomly created gamble pairs for the experiment similarly to the
procedure in Experiment 1. In addition, 10 pairs of gambles were
created in each complexity condition where one gamble stochastically
dominated the other (in equal numbers, either the safer or the riskier
gamble dominated). In the complex condition, we created gambles
with four outcomes each; in the safe-easy condition the gamble with
the lower SD had only two outcomes; and in the risky-easy condition,
the gamble with the higher SD had only two outcomes. Presentation
of the gambles was similar to that in Experiment 1 (see Figure 6).
4.1.3 | Time pressure manipulation
Time pressure was individually determined by giving people 75 choices
from all complexity conditions in a practice block at the beginning of
the experiment. These gamble pairs were created according to the
same principles as in the complex condition but were different from
those in the main task and were not payoff relevant. As time pressure
manipulation, we used the 25% quantile from the reaction times of all
choices from the respective participant in the training block. This
resulted in an average time limit of 4.12 s in the time pressure condi-
tion. In the control condition, there was again a very low time pres-
sure of 30 s.
4.1.4 | Participants and incentives
We recruited 60 participants to increase power compared with Exper-
iment 1. All participants were psychology students and were recruited
via the online recruiting platform of the Department of Psychology at
the University of Basel. Participants received course credit and a mon-
etary bonus ranging from CHF 1.20 to 19.60 (mean CHF 10.86) for an
average study duration of about 1 h. Participants had a median age of
22 years (range 19–51 years); 44 were female and 16 male.
4.1.5 | Procedure
The experiment was conducted on a computer at individual worksta-
tions, similarly to Experiment 1. Again, a quiz had to be passed to start
F IGURE 6 Schematic screenshot for the task in Experiment 2 with ECU the currency used during the experiment and the time left indicated
at the top-right. Left: decision screen in the complex condition. Right: decision screen when one gamble had two outcomes
8 OLSCHEWSKI AND RIESKAMP
the experiment, which consisted of five blocks with 75 choices each.
The first block was always the practice block. The second and third
blocks were the control or the time pressure conditions with order
alternated between participants. As incentive, one trial (excluding the
practice block) was drawn to be paid out. If a participant failed to obey
the time limit in a choice situation, a red warning message was pres-
ented for 1 s, and no choice could be made. If such a trial was drawn
for payout, there was no bonus payment.
4.2 | Results
4.2.1 | Choice data
Similar to in Experiment 1, there were fewer risky choices in the con-
trol condition (34%) than under time pressure (38%), W(n = 60) = 344,
p < .001. An effect of time pressure on choice consistency is suggested
by looking at the percentage of risky choices against different bins of
EV differences (Figure 7). As in Experiment 1, there was a crossing
point between the control and time pressure lines. This means that
under time pressure, choice proportions of the risky gamble were
closer to 50% both when the risky gamble was very unattractive and
when it was very attractive as compared with the control condition.
To examine the impact of time pressure on choice error, we
added a set of gamble pairs with stochastically dominant gambles.
Here, one can argue that participants should always choose the domi-
nant option irrespective of their individual risk preferences. Consis-
tently, in only a small proportion (3.33%) of trials did participants
choose the dominated riskier gamble in the control condition.
However, this error rate increased substantially to 9.70% under time
pressure, W(n = 60) = 69, p < .001. Likewise, participants chose
the dominated safe gamble in only 16.79% of trials in control,
but this error rate increased to 22.49% under time pressure,
W(n = 60) = 793, p = .006.
Across both conditions, complexity had an effect on the percent-
age of risky choices (Figure 8): in the complex condition, the risky
option was chosen in 34% of all trials, compared with 35% in the safe-
easy condition (bsafe = 0.22, p < .001) and 33% in the risky-easy condi-
tion (brisky = −0.22, p < .001). This result differs from Experiment
1 and is not in line with the idea that people are always more likely to
choose the easier of two gambles. As seen in Figure 8, the effect of
time pressure increased the percentage of risky choices for all com-
plexity conditions.
4.2.2 | Reaction time data
Reaction times were significantly different in control (Mdn = 4.27 s,
SD = 3.55) and time pressure (Mdn = 2.45 s, SD = 1.73) conditions,
F IGURE 7 Percentage of riskier
option choices by mean differences in
expected value (EV) between riskier and
safer gambles on the group (line and large
dots) and individual (small dots) level
F IGURE 8 Percentage of riskier option choices in control and
time pressure conditions for each of the three levels of gamble
complexity. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals
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W(n = 60) = 1,817, p < .001. There was an effect of block on reaction
times in the control trials in that participants were slower in the first
blocks (Mdn = 5.08 s, SD = 3.98) than in the last blocks (Mdn = 3.65 s,
SD = 2.83), W(n = 60) = 1.686, p < .001. That is, participants became
faster during the experiment so that the induced time pressure might
have been experienced as less severe at the end of the experiment
than at the beginning. Figure 9 shows that participants took longer
when both gambles were complex as compared with trials where one
gamble had only two instead of four outcomes (bsafe = −0.10,
p < .001; brisky = −0.16, p < .001).
4.2.3 | Modeling choice data
Similar to in Experiment 1, we found that time pressure credibly
affected the choice consistency parameter θ but not the risk prefer-
ence parameter β. This result was robust to all model specification, as
can be seen in Table S2. The model with the lowest WAIC included
main effects of complexity for both the risk preference and the choice
consistency parameters. In this model, the group-level risk preference
parameter was β0 = −0.57, 95% HDI [−0.76, −0.37], showing that
people were in general risk averse. The group-level choice consistency
parameter was θ0 = −0.49, 95% HDI [−0.59, −0.39]. The group-level
effect of time pressure on risk preference was δβ = −0.02, 95%
HDI [−0.06, 0.02]. Because the 95% posterior HDI included 0, there
was no credible effect of time pressure on people's risk preferences.
In contrast, time pressure credibly reduced people's choice consis-
tency on the group level with δθ = −0.14, 95% HDI [−0.18, −0.09].
Retransformed to the scale of the data model, the consistency param-
eter was estimated to be 0.26 in the control condition and 0.36 under
time pressure. Thus, again, it was choice consistency rather than risk
preferences that explained the changes in risky choices under time
pressure. Figure 10 shows the group posteriors and individual mean
posteriors for both parameters.
Again, we checked the robustness of this result with respect to
other link functions. With a logit link function, we found that group-
level risk preferences did not change because of time pressure,
δβ = −0.02, 95% HDI [−0.06, 0.01], whereas the logit consistency
parameter indicated credibly lower group-level consistency under
time pressure, δφ = 0.10, 95% HDI [0.07, 0.14]. For the trembling-
hand error, group-level risk preference did not change, δβ = −0.02,
95% HDI [−0.08, 0.02], but the trembling-hand error parameter indi-
cated credibly lower group-level consistency under time pressure,
δρ = −0.14, 95% HDI [−0.19, −0.08].
4.2.4 | Gamble complexity
We report the group-level effects of gamble complexity on the prefer-
ence and consistency parameter in the best fitting model (all main
effects, no interactions): participants were less risk averse in choices
when the safer gamble had only two outcomes compared with when
both gambles had four outcomes (βsafe = 0.20, 95% HDI [0.09, 0.30]).
However, the effect of the risky-easy condition on the risk parameter
F IGURE 9 Median reaction times (in seconds) in control and time
pressure conditions for each of the three levels of gamble complexity.
Error bars are 95% confidence intervals
F IGURE 10 Group posterior
distributions at the margins and
individual mean posterior
parameter estimates in the main
graphs for risk preference β (left)
and choice consistency θ (right)
for the best model (Model 4 in
Table S2) including main effects
of condition and complexity
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was not credibly different from 0 (βrisky = −0.09, 95% HDI [−0.19,
0.01]). The effect of gamble complexity on choice consistency was
not credibly different from zero for the safe-easy condition
(θsafe = −0.04, 95% HDI [−0.09, 0.01]) but was for the risky-easy con-
dition (θrisky = −0.13, 95% HDI [−0.18, −0.08]). The trend in both con-
ditions means that there was higher choice consistency when one
gamble had only two outcomes.
4.2.5 | Strategy shift
We examined to what extent the change in choice proportions due to
time pressure could be accounted for by a strategy shift. The group-
level mixture variable was z0 = −0.56, 95% HDI [−0.83, −0.30], mean-
ing that across both conditions, the probability that a participants was
classified as using one of the three NC strategies was 29%. The effect
of time pressure was not statistically credible, δz = −0.25, 95%
HDI [−0.50, 0.01]. However, descriptively, the probability of classify-
ing someone as using an NC strategy was higher under time pressure
(38%) than in the control condition (21%). Looking at the individual
posterior distributions, 22 participants under time pressure and 10 in
the control condition had a higher than 50% posterior probability of
their choices being better explained by an NC than the compensatory
strategy. Possibly, the higher gamble complexity in Experiment
2 increased the overall use of NC strategies compared with
Experiment 1.
The group-level threshold for the three NC strategies was
μ = 0.01, 95% HDI [0.0002, 0.02], and the group-level trembling-hand
error rate was ε = 0.18, 95% HDI [0.13, 0.24]. The three mixture prob-
abilities on the group level were g1 = 0.16, 95% HDI [0.03; 0.32], for
the probability order; g2 = 0.26, 95% HDI [0.09, 0.42], for the decreas-
ing outcome order; and g3 = 0.58, 95% HDI [0.38, 0.77], for the
increasing outcome order.
Similar to in Experiment 1, the conclusion concerning choice con-
sistency held when allowing for the use of NC strategies: on the group
level, choice consistency was still credibly decreased under time pres-
sure, δθ = −0.10, 95% HDI [−0.15, −0.05], whereas risk preference
was not, δβ = −0.01, 95% HDI [−0.05, 0.03].
5 | DISCUSSION
In two experiments, we examined the effect of time pressure on
repeated binary choices between risky gambles. We found that choice
proportions differed between conditions with high versus low time
pressure. To understand this behavioral change, we contrasted three
explanations: (a) time pressure systematically affects people's risk pref-
erences, (b) time pressure decreases choice consistency, and (c) time
pressure leads to a strategy shift from a compensatory to an NC strat-
egy. Across both studies using a random utility model implemented
within a hierarchical Bayesian framework, we found converging evi-
dence for a decrease in choice consistency as the main driver behind
the time pressure effect of a change in risky choices: in both studies,
the error variance of the random utility model increased under time
pressure, meaning that choice behavior moved toward 50% each for
the safer and riskier gamble. At the same time, there was no evidence
for an influence of time pressure on people's risk preferences.
We found some evidence of a strategy shift: when we compared a
compensatory (mean–variance) with several NC (comparing two single
outcomes) strategies in a Bayesian finite-mixture model, participants
were descriptively more likely to adhere to an NC strategy under time
pressure in both experiments (see also Payne et al., 1988; Rieskamp &
Hoffrage, 1999, 2008). On a group level, this shift in the mixture vari-
able reached statistical credibility in Experiment 1 but not in Experi-
ment 2. However, a strategy shift cannot fully account for the
behavioral effect of time pressure because choice consistency in the
compensatory strategy still decreased under time pressure, even when
allowing for the strategy shift option in the mixture model in both
experiments. This is consistent with the interpretation that most partic-
ipants stuck to a compensatory strategy also under time pressure but
performed this strategy less consistently under high time pressure.
5.1 | Strategy shifts under time pressure
In the strategy shift analysis, we used a Bayesian group-level finite-
mixture model. We thus assumed that a given participant used the
same strategy in every trial. That way, we limited the flexibility of the
finite-mixture model, but it might be interesting to examine trial-by-
trial shifts in strategies in future research (Scheibehenne et al., 2013).
We restricted the set of NC strategies to sequential outcome compar-
isons in three different orders as a straightforward principle to reduce
decision time. Yet other lexicographic strategies have been proposed
in the literature (e.g., Payne et al., 1988), most prominently the priority
heuristic (Brandstätter et al., 2006; Rieskamp, 2008). We cannot rule
out that the inclusion of other NC strategies could increase the
explanatory power of the strategy shift hypothesis. However, within
the finite-mixture model, adding too many strategies could make the
NC strategies overly flexible. A good design approach to examine
which strategies were used exactly is to use specific choice problems
and process measures to distinguish strategies from one another. We
see this approach and ours as complementary: whereas our study has
the advantage that results hold for the whole spectrum of possible
risk–reward combinations in a standardized procedure, more targeted
choice problem sets might be better suited to identifying the use of
particular strategies.
There was little evidence that time pressure increased the pro-
pensity to choose easier gambles. In Experiment 1, participants chose
the easier option more often when it was the safer one under time
pressure than in the control condition (see estimated interactions in
Table S1). However, this was not the case when the easier option was
the riskier one, and this result was not replicated in Experiment 2. It
might be that the safer option in Experiment 1 was a sure outcome
and that the elimination of all risk had an effect on choice behavior
beyond the complexity manipulation. An effect of time pressure on
the propensity to choose the easier option could be expected when
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people did not have the chance to fully comprehend the more com-
plex option under time pressure. However, when people shifted
toward NC strategies, for example, by comparing just one value from
each gamble to each other, complex gambles as defined in our experi-
ments did not take longer to evaluate than easy gambles.
Interestingly, the main effect of complexity on choice was hetero-
geneous across both studies even in the control condition: whereas
participants chose easier gambles more often than complex ones in
Experiment 1, they chose complex gambles more often than easier
ones in Experiment 2. Consequently, the difference in the complexity
manipulations (two-outcome gambles in Experiment 1 vs. four-
outcome gambles in Experiment 2) led to different effects on choice
proportions. In manipulating complexity, we controlled for the EV and
the variance but not for higher moments of the gamble, such as skew-
ness and kurtosis. Yet, higher moments might in particular play a role
in four-outcome gambles, contributing to the divergent findings across
the two studies (Ebert & Wiesen, 2011; Trautmann & van de
Kuilen, 2018). Consequently, gamble complexity seems to affect risk
taking in more sophisticated ways than just decreasing choice propor-
tions (see Moffatt et al., 2015; Zilker, Hertwig, & Pachur, 2020). None-
theless, given the respective complexity manipulations in our two
studies, we can robustly infer that time pressure did not systematically
affect choices between gambles with different levels of complexity.
5.2 | The importance of choice-data modeling
Although past research has suggested that time pressure can affect
people's risk preferences directly (e.g., Young et al., 2012), we did not
find support for this claim. However, previous studies usually did not
check for the choice consistency hypothesis. As described in our Sec-
tion 1, without controlling for choice consistency, a change in choice
proportions toward 50% is ambiguous with respect to its cause. Thus,
merely on the basis of choice proportions, we could also interpret our
participants' behavior as becoming less risk averse. Only with the help
of a random utility model with risk preference and choice consistency
as latent variables could we demonstrate that time pressure mainly
affected choice consistency rather than risk preferences (for a similar
approach compare Kirchler et al., 2017). Therefore, prior claims about
changes in risk preferences due to time pressure should be
reconsidered.
When under time pressure, people seemed to choose the option
that had, on average, higher utility for them less often. This shows
that a probit error variance parameter should not be treated as a nui-
sance parameter, as it carries psychological meaning (see Bhatia &
Loomes, 2017; Hey, 2005; Woodford, 2014). In its effect of moderat-
ing the number of “correct” choices, the probit error variance has a
similar function to the threshold in an evidence accumulation model
(see Webb, 2019). However, evidence accumulation models also take
reaction times into account and the threshold parameter might be
more established as a measure of a psychological process than the
probit error variance.
We can conceptualize the time pressure manipulation as a way of
reducing the decider's cognitive resources. In the real world, cognitive
resources are often limited in other ways as well, for example, in deci-
sion making under stress, acute alcohol intoxication, or sleep depriva-
tion (e.g., Cahlíková & Cingl, 2017; Davis-Stober et al., 2019;
Harrison & Horne, 2000; Porcelli & Delgado, 2009). Although under
all these circumstance different cognitive and neuronal mechanisms
might be at work, the basic problem of distinguishing between
changes in preferences and in choice consistency is the same. We
speculate that in real-world settings, such as high-stakes investments,
job-related or competitive-sport decision making, where time pressure
might be accompanied by social pressure, stress, and emotions, choice
consistency could deteriorate even more than in our experiments.
This should be a warning when people want to react quickly to new
information. Reacting quickly can be an advantage, but comes with
the cost of less accuracy (as in the speed–accuracy trade-off;
Heitz, 2014).
Besides these situational factors, there might also be cognitive
abilities, such as general intelligence, working memory capacity, or
numeracy, that affect choices under risk (see Kocher et al., 2019).
Although there have been attempts to link economic preferences to
cognitive abilities (Burks et al., 2009; Dohmen et al., 2010;
Lilleholt, 2019; Shamosh et al., 2008), future studies should also con-
trol for choice consistency when examining the impact of cognitive
abilities on decision-making behavior (see Andersson et al., 2016).
Finally, the same logic of distinguishing between preference and
consistency shifts can be applied to other domains of economic deci-
sion making besides risk taking: Olschewski et al. (2018) showed that
the effect of cognitive load manipulations led to similar effects to
those reported here in the domains of temporal discounting and social
decision making. To better understand the causes of changes in
behavior is also important in the debate about the social heuristic
hypothesis and the question of whether time pressure leads to fairer
choices or not (see Bouwmeester et al., 2017; Rand et al., 2012). In
sum, the current work illustrates that the interpretation of the behav-
ioral effect of cognitive resource manipulations such as time pressure
in preferential decision making should rely on a theoretical approach
that allows the testing of various hypotheses rigorously against each
other.
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